In this paper we examine the impact of membership in Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) on trade between PTA members. Rather than considering the impact of PTA membership on the volume of trade we consider the impact of membership on the structure of trade. For a large sample of countries over the period 1962-2000 we find that membership in a PTA is associated with an increase in the extent of intra-industry trade. In addition, we find that the effect of PTA membership on IIT is larger when a PTA is formed between two developed countries.
Introduction
In the last two decades there has been a proliferation in the number of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs).
1 According to Urata and Okabe (2007) the number of PTAs reported to the WTO was 25 in 1990, 91 in 2000 and 194 in 2007 . For a long time most PTAs were regional in focus with members being geographically close to each other (e.g. EU, NAFTA).
More recently however countries or regional blocs have signed PTAs with diverse and geographically distant partners. 2 Moreover, regional groupings have become more diverse (e.g. ASEAN).
As discussed in the literature (see for example Frankel, Stein and Wei, 1996) there is a tradeoff involved when discussing the benefits of PTA membership. On the one hand, there is a trade creation effect that comes from the elimination in distortions between the relative prices of domestic goods and those of other members. On the other hand, there exists the potential for a trade distortion effect due to the introduction of distortions between the relative prices of member and non-member goods. By now a large number of empirical papers have addressed the issue of whether membership in a PTA creates trade between members (see Section 2 below). A related issue that has been addressed is whether trade diversion is also an outcome of the presence of a PTA; that is, is trade between a member and a non-member reduced as a result of the presence of the PTA? These issues have usually been addressed using the gravity equation, with the results being mixed depending upon the sample, the time period, the specification of the gravity equation and the particular PTAs considered.
To date the vast majority of papers considering PTAs have concentrated on the issue of whether trade creation and/or trade diversion effects of PTAs are present, usually using data on total bilateral trade or total exports as the variable of interest and dummies for the presence (or absence) of a PTA between two countries. There are very few papers that consider how
PTAs affect trade however, recent exceptions being Urate and Okabe (2007) who examine the impact of PTAs on industry-level trade and Egger et al (2008) who consider the effect on the structure of trade.
In this paper, rather than examine whether PTA membership affects the level of trade between members (as well as between members and non-members) we examine whether membership in PTAs is associated with a change in the structure of trade between members. As discussed by Egger et al (2008) this issue has been largely ignored to date in the empirical literature. Yet the issue of whether joining a PTA stimulates gains due to specialisation, i.e. inter-industry trade, or to gains from scale economies and product differentiation, i.e. intra-industry trade, would seem to be an important one when considering the benefits of PTAs and the question of which countries should form a PTA. In particular, if most of the growth in trade due to the presence of a PTA is attributable to intra-industry trade, then the resource reallocation effects in the short-to medium-run are likely to be lower than if inter-industry trade was most affected, since the change would require little inter-industry factor movements. In this paper, we examine whether membership in PTAs has a significant impact upon the popular GrubelLloyd index of intra-industry trade (IIT) in a gravity framework. To examine this issue we use data from Feenstra et al (2005) on up to 168 countries over the period 1962-2000 3 . Compared with the data and sample used by Egger et al (2008) the current paper considers a larger sample of countries, with countries at differing levels of development, and a longer time period. In terms of the method, the current paper makes use of the gravity equation, which is common in this type of literature, while Egger et al (2008) make use of the more advanced matching estimator. Our results indicate that membership in a PTA is associated with an increase in the extent of IIT. In addition, we find that the effect of PTA membership on IIT is larger when a PTA is formed between two developed countries.
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing evidence on the impact of PTAs, while Section 3 discusses our main hypotheses, our empirical approach and the data used. Section 4 discusses our main results and Section 5 reports some robustness results. Section 6 concludes.
Existing Evidence on the Impact of PTAs
The gravity equation has been developed as the standard tool to estimate the effects of PTAs on trade between members (early studies include Tinbergen, 1962 and Aitken, 1973) . A dummy variable taking the value one if two countries are both members of a PTA is included in the gravity equation and used as an indicator of the effect of PTA membership on trade flows between member countries (i.e. trade creation effects). A number of extensions to this standard methodology have been considered. One such extension has been to consider specific PTAs rather than bundling them all into one dummy variable by constructing PTA dummies for each of a number of specific PTAs. This allows one to examine the impact on trade flows of specific PTAs.
Using such an approach has lead to mixed results. Aitken (1973) , Abrams (1980) and Brada and Mendez (1983) for example found membership in the European Community to have a positive and significant effect on trade flows among members, while Bergstrand (1985) and Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995) found insignificant effects. Frankel (1997) finds a positive impact from MERCOSUR membership, insignificant effects from membership in the Andean pact, and occasionally negative effects from membership in the European Community.
A number of studies have also attempted to examine the potential trade diversion effects of
PTAs by including binary variables that take the value one if only one member of a country pair belongs to a PTA. Frankel, Stein and Wei (1996) A further extension of the literature has been to deal with the potential endogeneity of the PTA variable: membership in PTAs is likely to be endogenous as countries self-select into PTAs for reasons related to the level of trade for example. have noted that the issue of endogeneity has received very little attention in the literature with few studies (exceptions being Bergstrand, 2002, and Magee, 2003) using instrumental variables or Heckman control functions to address this issue (often with mixed results). They go on to argue that panel regression may be a better solution to address this issue, either through the use of first differences (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997) or country-pair fixed effects (Cheng and Wall, 2002 (2003) . This tends to lower the estimated effects of the European trade agreements, but with the exception of EFTA, the effect is still substantial. Baier and Bergstrand (2004) find evidence that country-pairs that have PTAs tend to share similar characteristics. In particular they find that two countries are more likely to have a PTA the larger and more similar their GDPs are, the closer they are to each other but the more remote the pair are from the rest of the world, and the wider (narrower) the difference in their relative factor endowments with respect to each other (rest of the world). Using this information Baier and Bergstrand (2002) use an instrumental variables estimator to examine the impact of PTAs on trade for the year 2000, but find that the exogeneity of the instruments has to be rejected. A Heckman control function approach also does not solve the problem of endogeneity, with the results found to be very unstable.
An alternative method for dealing with one aspect of endogeneity -selection bias -is to use matching econometrics. This is the approach adopted by who match country pairs with PTAs to virtually identical country pairs without PTAs, based on a set of common economic characteristics. The average effect of the treated (i.e. country pairs with PTAs) and the untreated are then compared. They again find coefficients that tend to be larger than those in the literature that don't account for endogeneity, with the average longrun effect of a PTA being to increase trade by 100 percent. As discussed by Baier and Bergstrand (2002) , two common forms of the gravity equation have been estimated,
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where ‫ܲܺܧ‬ is the value of merchandise flow imported by country ݆ from exporter ݅, ‫ܲܦܩ‬ ‫ܲܦܩ(‬ ) is the level of nominal gross domestic product of country ݅ (݆), ܱܲܲ (ܱܲܲ ) is the level of population in country ݅ (݆), ‫ܶܵܫܦ‬ is the distance between economic centres of countries ݅ and ݆, ‫ܩܰܣܮ‬ is a binary variable equal to one if countries ݅ and ݆ share a common language, ‫ܬܦܣ‬ is a binary variable equal to one if countries ݅ an ݆ share a common border, ‫ܭܥܱܮ‬ is a variable accounting for whether none, one or both countries are landlocked, and ‫ܣܶܲ‬ is a binary variable equal to one if countries ݅ and ݆ have a preferential trade agreement. In the second specification the value of exports from ݅ to ݆ is replaced by the total level of trade (i.e. imports plus exports) between the country pair, ‫ܧܦܣܴܶ‬ . 7 All variables with the exception of the dummy variables are usually included in log-form. 7 In the former case we are thus able to examine the coefficients on the level of GDP and population for the exporter and importer separately, while in the latter case we consider the product of the GDPs and populations. Considering these variables separately in this case makes little sense as the classification of country ݅ and ݆ is determined by the ordering of the data.
The starting point for our analysis therefore is the following equation;
where ‫ܶܫܫ‬ is our indicator of the extent of intra-industry trade (i.e. the. Grubel-Lloyd index) and the addition of the ‫ݐ‬ subscript is due to the panel nature of our regression model. The variable definitions are all as described above, with ‫ܭܥܱܮ‬ taking on the value 0, 1 or 2 depending on whether none, one or both countries are landlocked respectively. There has been a great deal of debate in the literature on the appropriate specification of gravity models in a panel context (see Matyas, 1997 Matyas, , 1998 Egger, 2000, Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006) , which lead us to make a number of modifications to the above equation. Firstly, in all of our regressions we include a set of time dummies to take account of bilateral-pair invariant time specific effects. Secondly, in some specifications we include a full set of bilateral-pair fixed effects in our model to account for time-invariant bilateral pair specific effects. It has been argued in the literature (Glick and Rose, 2002 ) that including such effects can account for the multilateral resistance term of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) . 8 The inclusion of bilateral-pair fixed effects means that we cannot estimate the coefficients on time-invariant variables such as distance. Our estimating equation in this case becomes therefore,
where ߜ ௧ and ߱ refer to the time and bilateral-pair fixed effects.
In addition to examining the importance of PTAs for total trade and trade structure in general, we also consider the trade creation effects of specific PTAs. To account for trade creation effects we include a set of dummies for particular PTAs. The PTAs we consider are the same as used by Eicher et al (2004) . 9 The regression model with bilateral-pair fixed effects in this case is thus,
Data on the GDP and population of the importer and exporter are from the World Development Indicators (2008) The reason for considering alternative sources is that the WTO dataset only includes PTAs in force, thus excluding a number of PTAs that are no longer in force, but that would have been in the period of interest, examples being the PTAs agreed between the EU-15 and Romania, Bulgaria and others in the 1990s, but which are no longer in force now that these countries are now members of the EU. 14 See Lloyd (1971 and 1975) .
where ݅ and ݆ refer to countries and ݇ refers to industries or product categories. The measure is an indicator of the intensity of IIT in industry ݇. The index takes on values between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating more IIT.
This index is often adjusted to take account of the fact that goods trade can be unbalanced due to profit repatriation (see for example Lloyd, 1971, and Egger et al, 2008) . The corrected index (CGLI) is calculated as follows,
Results
The initial results are split into 2 sections. The first section reports the results when we include a dummy for the presence of a PTA between country pairs; the second considers the twelve PTAs considered by Eicher et al (2004) separately and examines how the structure of trade has been affected by each of these PTAs.
RTAs and the Structure of Trade
The first three columns of Table 1 report the results for total trade, GLI and CGLI respectively from pooled regressions, where no country or country-pair fixed effects are included, while the final three columns report the results when including bilateral-pair fixed effects to control for endogeneity. Including bilateral-pair fixed effects means that we cannot include time-invariant bilateral-pair specific effects, such as distance, common language, and so on.
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In Column (1) we see that the coefficients on the majority of the gravity determinants are as expected, with a negative coefficient on distance (slightly smaller in absolute value than the usual coefficient of around minus one) and landlockedness, and positive coefficients on the common border and common language dummies. The coefficients on the product of the GDP's are positive, with a value around one, as expected, and we obtain small, negative (but significant) coefficients on the product of the importer's and exporter's populations. Finally, the coefficient on the PTA dummy is positive and significant, indicating significant trade creation effects. The size of the coefficient is in line with estimates in the literature (see for example, Baier and Bergstrand, 2002) . When considering the GLI and CGLI indices of IIT we find coefficients on the gravity determinants that are consistent, in terms of sign and significance, with those for total trade (except for landlocked, which varies in sign and tends to be insignificant). The coefficients on the PTA variable are also found to be positive and significant, indicating that countries sharing a PTA tend to engage in higher levels of intraindustry trade.
The results in the final three columns are largely consistent with those reported in the first three columns. The coefficients on the product of the GDPs remain positive and significant, though somewhat smaller than in the first three columns, while the coefficients on the product of the populations tend to remain negative and significant. The coefficients on the PTA dummies are again positive and significant for both total trade and GLI and CGLI. When considering total trade the coefficient is larger than that reported in Column 1, consistent with 15 All regressions include a full set of time dummies (which are in all cases jointly significant).
findings in other studies (e.g. , while the coefficients on the PTA dummies when considering GLI and CGLI are somewhat smaller than the corresponding results in Columns 2 and 3, though they remain highly significant. 
Trade Creating and Diverting Effects of Specific RTAs
Rather than lumping all PTAs together in one dummy variable it may be interesting to examine the impact of specific PTAs on trade and the structure of trade. This could, for example, provide insights into whether PTAs between rich countries produce greater trade creation effects or greater trade structure effects. To consider this we introduce dummies for each of the twelve PTAs considered by Eicher et al (2004) and examine the coefficients on the dummies for both total trade and the measures of IIT. The results are reported in Table 2 .
Once again the first three columns report the pooled results where no country effects are included, while the final three columns report results including bilateral-pair fixed effects.
The coefficients on the gravity determinants in Table 2 are largely as expected, with the exception of the landlocked variable, which becomes positive and significant for the two measures of IIT in Columns 2 and 3. In Column 1 we find positive trade creation effects for all 12 PTAs with the exception of EEA and NAFTA, for which we find negative and significant coefficients. The results in Column 4 are similar, though ANZCERTA now also shows a negative, albeit insignificant, coefficient. When considering the impacts of specific PTAs on IIT we again find positive and significant coefficients in the majority of cases, indicating that members of these PTAs engage in greater IIT between themselves. The two exceptions are AP and LAIA for which we often find evidence of a negative effect of PTA membership on IIT. The implication for these two PTAs is that the benefits in terms of trade of being a member of these PTAs arises due to increases in specialisation and inter-industry trade. When considering the level of IIT we find relatively large coefficients on the PTA dummy for ANZCERTA, NAFTA, the EU and MERCOSUR (see Columns 5 and 6). The first three of these agreements involve mainly high-income countries, while the latter one also involves countries at similar income levels, i.e. upper-middle income countries according to the World Development Report (2000) . For trade volumes however, we tend to find the largest trade creating effects of PTAs to be for agreements between lesser-developed countries, e.g. LAIA, APEC, MERCOSUR and AP. As discussed above, we may expect a non-linear relationship between PTA membership and the extent of IIT between countries. In particular, we may expect -in line with the Linder hypothesis (Linder, 1961) -that a PTA between developed countries will increase the potential for IIT since their income levels and preferences will be similar. In addition, RodasMartini (1998) found that the effects of PTAs and IIT in less developing countries are insignificant. As such, we may expect that an interaction between the PTA dummy and a 16 Note that we cannot estimate the coefficient for the trade creating effects of CACM in our sample when country-pair fixed effects are included. This is because the PTA was implemented prior to the start of the sample period implying that there is no variation in the dummy over time.
variable capturing the (logged) product of the two countries GDP per capita ‫)ܦܱܴܲܥܲܲܦܩ(‬ will be positive. Globerman (1992) argues however that the formation of a PTA between a developed and a developing country may increase the potential for IIT. Globerman's explanation for this is that developing countries have suffered from high levels of industrial concentration and made scant use of economies of scale, such that developing countries would benefit from the powerful stimulus toward rationalization of production provided by free trade. Mexico, for example, has experienced a rapid increase in IIT since the late 1980s and has simultaneously had trade links with the Unites States following the implementation of various stages of the NAFTA agreement. As a result, the elimination of tariff barriers and Mexico's relatively low labour costs has led to the setting up of the 'maquiladora ' in the border region, which are devoted to the assembly and re-export of goods. Among them, the scope for IIT in manufactured goods is much higher than other goods. If this hypothesis is correct we would expect there to be a positive coefficient on the interaction between the (logged) absolute difference in GDP per capita ‫)ܨܫܦܥܲܲܦܩ(‬ between two trade partners.
We re-estimate the regression models in Table 1 including these interaction terms. The results when including these interactions are reported in Table 3 . The results for total trade indicate that the trade creating effects of PTAs are smaller for trade partners with a larger value of ‫.ܦܱܴܲܥܲܲܦܩ‬ As such, PTA formation between more developed countries has a lower trade creating effect than between either two developing countries or between a developed and a developing country. The coefficients on the interaction with ‫ܨܫܦܥܲܲܦܩ‬ are positive when considering trade volumes, suggesting that the trade creating effects of PTA formation are greater when formed between a developed and a developing country, though our results do not show how such benefits are shared between the two countries. When considering our indicators of IIT the coefficient on the PTA dummy is negative and significant, while that on the interaction with ‫ܦܱܴܲܥܲܲܦܩ‬ is positive and significant, indicating that the formation of a PTA between two developed countries has a greater impact on the extent of IIT. 17 For the interaction with ‫ܨܫܦܥܲܲܦܩ‬ the results are mixed, being negative and significant for the pooled results, but positive and significant when bilateral-pair fixed effects are included.
18 Table 3 : Non-Linear Effects -Pooled Results (2) and (3) on the interaction of the PTA dummy with GDPPCDIF become positive if the other interaction term is excluded. The sign of the coefficients on the interaction of the PTA dummy with GDPPCPROD are also positive and significant if the GDPPCDIF interaction is excluded, consistent with the results in Table 3 . We choose not to report results when only one of the interaction terms is included for reasons of brevity.
Robustness
In this section we report the results from a number of robustness tests. In particular, we consider the results from Tobit regressions, which account for the fact that a large number of the observations on our measures of IIT are censored at either zero or one. Table 4 reports the results from pooled Tobit regressions that include time dummies in the specification for the GLI and CGLI index (Columns 1-2), as well as random effects panel
Tobit results (Columns 3-4). We don't report fixed effects panel Tobit results since there doesn't exist a fixed effects Tobit regression specification, as there does not exist a sufficient statistic allowing the fixed effects to be conditioned out of the likelihood. Honore (1992 Honore ( , 2008 ) has however developed a semi-parametric estimator for fixed effects Tobit regression models. To be consistent with the above tables however, we drop the time-invariant variables from the random effects specifications in Columns 3 and 4. The coefficients on the gravity determinants are largely consistent with those reported in Table 1 , while the coefficients on the PTA dummies are again positive and significant, indicating a positive impact of PTA membership on IIT. If anything, the coefficients are slightly lower than those in Table 1 . Table 5 reports Tobit results when individual dummies for different PTAs are included. In the pooled results (Columns 1 and 2) we find evidence of a positive effect of PTA membership on IIT for all PTAs, with the effect usually being significant. The random effects results are somewhat different with negative and significant effects found for AP and in one case EEA.
For AP therefore the results are consistent with those reported above. The major difference is that the negative effect of LAIA becomes positive when we account for censoring, while the previous positive effect of EEA is now negative. Once again the coefficients on the PTA variable tend to be relatively large for ANZCERTA, the EU, NAFTA and MERCOSUR, with relatively large coefficients also found for CACM and CARICOM. Finally, we repeat the non-linear results using the Tobit specification, with the results reported in Table 6 . The results on the interaction terms in Table 6 are consistent across specifications.
As with the results in Table 3 we find a positive coefficient on the interaction with the product of the GDP's per capita ‫.)ܦܱܴܲܥܲܲܦܩ(‬ The results again suggest therefore that the effects of PTA membership on IIT are strongest when the PTA is formed between two developed countries. The coefficients on the interaction between the PTA dummy and the difference in per capita GDPs are consistently negative, suggesting that the greater the difference in per capita GDP ‫)ܨܫܦܥܲܲܦܩ(‬ between trade partners the lower the impact on IIT of the formation of a PTA between partners. The results suggest that forming a PTA between a developed and a developing country is likely to have a negative impact on the extent of IIT, a result against the hypothesis of Globerman (1992). Over the past two decades there has been a proliferation in the number of PTAs. Originally
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PTAs were formed between geographically close countries as well as countries with similar levels of income, but more recently PTAs have been agreed with more geographically diverse countries and countries at highly different levels of development. Empirical research over the past fifteen years or so has shown that the effects of the formation of such PTAs has been to create trade between PTA members. The evidence on whether such PTAs divert trade from non-members to members of a PTA is more mixed, but some evidence at least exists to suggest that such effects may be present. What has largely been neglected in the empirical literature to date is the question of how such trade creation and diversion effects occur.
In this paper we add to the literature by examining for a large panel of countries the extent to which PTA membership affects the structure of trade, and in particular whether membership affects the extent of intra-industry trade. Our results suggest that the formation of a PTA is associated with an increase in IIT between PTA members. When considering individual PTAs we again find that with only a couple of exceptions the effect of PTA membership on IIT is positive. The cases in which a negative effect is found are for lower-and middle-income Latin American countries, while the largest positive effects tend to be found for PTAs between advanced, high-income countries. Our results also indicate the presence of non-linear effects in the relationship between PTA presence and IIT. In particular, we find that the impact of PTA presence on IIT is stronger when the two trade partners are developed countries. Much of the observed effect of PTAs on IIT would therefore seem to be driven by PTAs agreed between developed countries. When considering non-linearities due to differences in per capita GDPs the results are more mixed, but tend to suggest that the formation of a PTA between a developed and developing country has a negative effect on IIT.
The main results from the above analysis suggest that much of the trade creating effects of PTA formation are due to increased IIT. This conclusion has to be tempered somewhat, since this result seem to be driven by PTAs formed between developed countries (or at least between countries with similar income levels), with the effect on IIT for agreements between dissimilar countries being negative. Future research in this area may consider examining in more detail the country-pairs that are likely to benefit in terms of trade creation and IIT from forming a PTA. Such factors may include the country's level of development, economic size and factor endowments.
